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About the authors  
Tina Søreide is a Norwegian economist at Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), an independent research 
institute based in Norway. Claudio Weber Abramo is the executive director of Transparência Brasil, 
an NGO dedicated to combating corruption in Brazil.  
About this report 
Much has been said about anti-corruption initiatives, about the causes and consequences of 
corruption, and about what governments can do to combat this problem. Most discussions and 
policy recommendations focus on what governments can do within their jurisdictions. This report 
takes a different approach by exploring how countries and players can combat corruption through 
cross-border collaboration.  
Bilateral collaboration and Norwegian presence in Brazilian markets 
The report argues that the fight against corruption needs stronger transnational cooperation and 
attempts to map out issues that might be relevant for such collaboration. The focus is on corruption 
in the business environment and the situations reported concern trade between Norway and Brazil, 
with a focus on Norwegian presence in Brazil. Although the Norwegian Government is well 
concerned about corruption in Norwegian markets, this report is commissioned by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and relates to broader perspectives on how to promote Norwegian 
industry and Norwegian interests in general, in foreign countries.  
 
Discussions of corruption and anti-corruption initiatives can often appear too general and too 
abstract.  Addressing bilateral anti-corruption collaboration between specific countries has the 
advantage of forcing discussion to take a practical perspective on the challenges presented by 
corruption.  Such a perspective will include a recognition and assessment of existing counter-
corruption institutions and initiatives - and of how they work out in particular socio-political 
environments.  
 
Brazil is an important market for Norwegian industry and dialogue between the two countries is 
already good. The present study is part of a broader initiative to strengthen those ties.  
Realistic perspective 
Transnational dialogue on an issue as sensitive as corruption requires the ability to address such 
challenges from a realistic perspective. While research data on the prevalence of corruption are 
incomplete and far from reliable, they do give grounds for assuming that the problem is quite 
common – in most countries. Collaboration will not work unless we recognize that corruption is 
challenging the business environment.  To encourage realistic perspectives on the issues, the initial 
sections of this report will present and discuss some background information on perspectives on 
corruption in Brazil, including Norwegian firms’ responsibility and their attitudes to corruption in 
foreign markets.  
Workable initiatives  
Collaboration can be fruitful only if it supports initiatives with a practical impact. Anti-corruption 
initiatives in business-related environments take very different forms – such as encouraging ethical 
conduct, monitoring transactions, improving procedures, or sanctioning detected crime.  In order to 
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identify possible initiatives for collaboration between countries, we will begin by discussing anti-
corruption measures in general with a view to highlighting some factors that might be important to 
understanding their effectiveness.  
 
On the basis of these discussions, we will then offer some suggestions about anti-corruption 
collaboration. However, our ambition in this report is not to provide an exhaustive list of the 
relevant issues, but rather to stimulate some initiatives. 
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Executive summary  
1. Introduction 
1.1 International conventions against corruption, signed and ratified by a growing number of 
countries, are an important tool in combating corruption. However, conventions are merely 
legal permissions, and will change nothing unless they are actually implemented. Greater 
collaboration across countries is now needed in order to draw real benefits from legal reforms.  
 
1.2 General discussions about collaboration often produce vague conclusions and ineffectual policy 
recommendations because they do not take account of the specific circumstances relating to 
particular countries. This report examines the relationship between Norway and Brazil, two 
very different countries in different regions, yet with strong trade relations and good dialogue. 
A programme for collaboration on anti-corruption between different countries might identify 
new aspects for consideration and be useful in a broader anti-corruption perspective.  
2. Anti-corruption initiatives: What works?  
2.1 Collaboration on anti-corruption requires a common understanding of what initiatives might 
work. There are different categories of anti-corruption initiatives: laws and regulations, 
economic incentives, and more or less coordinated voluntary initiatives. To be effective, an 
anti-corruption programme should ideally include a combination of initiatives. In addition, it is 
useful to distinguish between initiatives that focus on preventing corruption and initiatives that 
focus on uncovering and prosecuting corruption after the event, although the two can clearly 
overlap.  
 
2.2 The choice of initiatives is complicated, however.  On the one hand, factors that are often 
thought to influence the incidence of corruption, such as the risk of being apprehended, 
sanctions, and lower returns from the involvement in such crime, are all very difficult to 
implement. On the other hand, the introduction of voluntary initiatives to reduce business 
corruption often proves ineffective because it entails encouraging agents to act responsibly 
while leaving them with a choice.  However, there are grounds for differentiating between 
compliance systems within firms, which often are efficient, and voluntary initiatives 
introduced to regulate firms as players in a market, which often have little impact. 
 
2.3 Efforts invested in developing initiatives to reduce corruption should – as far as possible – 
focus on diminishing externally given opportunities for such crime, and not rely primarily on 
agents’ moral values or disincentives to be involved. Most countries would benefit from a 
stronger emphasis on formal regulation, forced transparency via the enactment of freedom of 
information laws, close monitoring of decision-making processes, reform of public 
procurement regulations and so forth – that is to say, measures that act on the objective 
circumstances that favor corruption. 
3. Anti-corruption initiatives in Brazil 
3.1 A fruitful collaboration will require realistic perspectives on the issues considered. Brazil has 
signed and implemented anti-corruption conventions and, at least at the Federal level, is 
gradually building better means to prevent and combat corruption, including strengthening the 
General Comptroller’s Office (CGU). Nevertheless, the implementation of anti-corruption 
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initiatives nationwide is challenged by the country’s high level of decentralization, under 
which every state and municipality is fully responsible for planning, executing and controlling 
its expenditures. 
 
3.2 Private firms in Brazil report that corruption is one of their main constraints. According to 
one survey, a majority had been asked for bribes in connection with procurement or 
taxation. A significant proportion of private companies stating a willingness both to participate 
in voluntary anti-corruption programmes and to pay/invest money in order to reduce the 
problem. Nevertheless, most firms do not defend their rights against decisions taken by public 
officials that they perceive to be contestable. 
4. Norwegian firms in Brazil 
4.1  Norwegian industry is strong in sectors that are considered prone to corruption in any country. 
Despite significant emphasis in Norway on the responsibility of firms, corruption is a challenge 
for Norwegian exporters. Some understanding of the particular contexts in which challenges to 
honest business practice arise was obtained through interviews with executives of Norwegian 
firms operating in Brazil and with some of their Brazilian business partners, as well as through 
a business survey of Norwegian exporters conducted in 2004. Challenging situations occur 
most frequently in association with the process of getting established in Brazilian markets, in 
dealing with customs and taxation, and in responding to situations when competitors appear to 
have gained benefits through corruption or other forms of financial crime.  
5. A programme for collaboration  
5.1 Recommendations for collaboration are developed on the basis of the current status of the 
international fight against corruption, the “what works” debate, and the perspectives of some 
Norwegian and Brazilian firms. The following four areas appear particularly relevant.  
 
5.2 Customs regulation and procedures: Complex bureaucratic regulations and slow procedures 
were described as a source of corruption. Collaboration could therefore take the form of 
establishing a permanent forum where obstacles are discussed between representatives of 
import/export firms and the authorities. 
 
5.3 Public procurement: The most common form of corruption in public procurement occurs when 
conditions for participation in a tender competition are defined in such a way as to preordain 
the result. One mechanism that can help reduce this risk would be for tender conditions to be 
subjected to public discussion before the formal call is made. 
 
5.4 Legal cooperation: Criminal organizations and firms involved in corruption exploit the situation 
of almost non-existent barriers to capital movement across borders, while investigations of 
corruption are usually restricted to the legal jurisdictions within which the crime occurs. 
Bilateral treaties are needed to bolster anti-corruption conventions.  There is no bilateral treaty 
on legal collaboration between Norway and Brazil. This should be considered and followed up 
with informal legal collaboration between judicial institutions. 
 
5.5 Academic collaboration: An important contribution to solving obstacles could be made by 
collaborative research between Brazil and Norway that draws on an interdisciplinary approach 
and includes different perspectives and data sets.  
 viii
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1. Introduction  
Background: International conventions against corruption   
The broad endorsement of international anti-corruption conventions during the last decade 
represents a significant step forward in the international fight against corruption. A legal and formal 
basis for collaboration across borders has been established. However, the implementation of these 
conventions, and the realization of the intentions behind them, will not come automatically. These 
will require substantial additional efforts. 
 
When the OECD Convention on cross-border bribery was enacted in November 1997, it was 
expected to have significant positive impacts on corruption.  A decade later, disappointingly few 
cases of transnational bribery have been prosecuted in signatory States.1 One of the reasons for this 
is that corruption is very difficult to prove and prosecute. Corrupt deals are not based on written 
contracts and there are numerous ways of hiding the transactions and of making it impossible to 
identify a connection between transactions and corrupt decision-making. As a result, there are very 
few convictions for corruption, even if business surveys, the media, and perception studies all 
suggest that corruption is widespread worldwide.  
 
The drafting of international conventions against corruption, and the growing number of countries 
that sign and ratify them, should not be seen as results. They merely set the stage for action. They 
consist in sets of formal stipulations, and are hence only tools, which means they will not change 
anything unless they are actually used. Using these tools to tackle cross-border corruption will 
require cross-border collaboration. The success of the conventions will therefore depend not only on 
individual jurisdictions, but also on the collaboration between them.  This will necessarily include 
dialogue on how to use the conventions to combat corruption.2
Bilateral collaboration and dialogue: Norway and Brazil 
The intention behind this report is to offer input to such dialogue. If not providing a complete set of 
solutions, it will discuss elements that should be included in a bilateral collaboration to combat 
cross-country corruption. The report focuses on such collaboration between two specific countries, 
Norway and Brazil. Although dialogue and collaboration between countries need not to be justified, 
there are some reasons behind this choice. 
 
1. By focusing on two specific countries the discussion becomes more orientated to practice 
and policy. Rather than describing optimal forms of collaboration and as many 
contingencies as possible, the report examines current status and what might be realistically 
achieved between Norway and Brazil.  
 
2. A desire to collaborate already exists between Brazil and Norway, as was underscored by 
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva during his visit to Norway in September 2007. Several 
initiatives have been initiated to improve dialogue, not only between the governments but 
also between public institutions, academic institutions, business organizations, and NGOs in 
both countries. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry, in particular, has been fostering such 
dialogue. 
                                                     
1  See Heimann et. al. (2005), (2006) and (2007). 
2  See also http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2006/oecd_progress#actions for Transparency International 
recommendations to improve enforcement of the OECD Convention. 
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3. Brazil represents a large market for the Norwegian export industry, in fact the largest 
market for Norwegian firms in Latin America.3 A large number of Norwegian firms have 
been active in Brazil over many years, including industries such as shipping, energy, 
timber, construction, and finance. Corruption is an issue in the context of trade relations, 
even if measured only by recurrent scandals and denunciation in the media. Dialogue on 
anti-corruption initiatives is relevant in all trade relations.  
 
For information about foreign direct investments and trade in goods and services between 
Brazil and Norway, see Statistics Norway.4 Statistical data on Norway-Brazilian trade can also 
be found at the home page of the Brazilian Ministry of International trade.5
 
                                                     
3 Norwegian exports to Brazil, excluding shipping and oil rigs, were worth $309, 8 million in 2006, while the value of 
Norway’s imports of goods from Brazil totaled approximately $580 million. Brazilian export from Norway included cod 
fish, diesel oil, paper, and machinery. Norwegian imports from Brazil consisted primarily of metal/aluminium, agricultural 
products, including coffee and oil seeds, and chemical products. 
4 See www.ssb.no  and http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/portalmdic/sitio/interna/interna.php?area=5&menu=576 
5 http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/portalmdic/sitio/interna/interna.php?area=5&menu=576. 
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2. Anti-corruption initiatives: what works?  
Corruption is often a cross-border activity, whereas investigation and prosecution are primarily 
national undertakings. Legal cooperation between countries is critically important to control the 
crime once it is detected. The UN Anti-Corruption Convention, to which both Brazil and Norway 
are signatories, is predicated upon the assumption that such cooperation will be forthcoming. 
Dialogue about the challenge of business corruption will establish a better basis for long term 
cooperation in this respect. 
 
However, cooperation on the investigation and prosecution of cases is not enough to control cross-
border business corruption. Cooperation is also required on the development of anti-corruption 
initiatives in general, including prevention of such crimes. Cooperation between very different 
countries, such as Brazil and Norway, can highlight new aspects of the problem for consideration 
and therefore be useful in developing broader anti-corruption perspectives.  
Initiatives to combat corruption  
The many anti-corruption initiatives introduced during the last decade take very different 
approaches to the problem.6 Most initiatives fall into one of the following four groups:  
 
• Laws and regulations: Such as the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the OECD Anti-
Corruption Convention, and improved procurement rules adopted by individual countries; 
• Coordinated voluntary initiatives: Global Compact, Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), initiatives that evolved from cooperation between businesses and 
governments, where various actors accept obligations and some level of control; 
• Uncoordinated voluntary initiatives: Company codes of conduct and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) policies.  
• Economic incentives: Norwegian Oil Fund, World Bank blacklisting, environmental taxes. 
 
These types of initiatives can be categorized according to a scale, with laws and regulations, 
external monitoring efforts and enforcement on one side of the axis, and initiatives aimed at 
eliciting voluntary action on the other. Incentives that rely on economic mechanisms are a separate 
category. An important distinction can be drawn between anti-corruption measures that focus on 
preventing or limiting contexts in which opportunities for bribery arise and anti-corruption 
measures that focus on detection, prosecution and punishment after the event.  
 
Initiatives to strengthen after-the-event efforts basically concern complaints from interested parties 
about decisions already taken by the administration. The measures are thus by definition limited to 
stimulating ways for complaints to be presented to and processed by the State. Initiatives to 
strengthen before-the-event efforts, on the other hand, cover the whole spectrum from regulatory 
and State-management reforms to establishing better information exchange mechanisms between 
the State and society (including private firms), thus adding to mutual trust. 
 
Given the observed reluctance of firms to complain about perceived corruption after the event, 
establishing hotlines and similar mechanisms are in themselves unlikely to resolve the obvious lack 
of trust in the public authorities. Preventative measures are more likely to be effective in this 
respect. By submitting to discussion matters that concern both firms and the government, it 
                                                     
6  See Kolstad, Fritz and O’Neil (2007) for information about various initiatives and discussion about how they work.   
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becomes possible to build a relationship leading to mutual trust. It is important to observe that, in 
order to build trust, such dialogues should always be public and open to the participation of all 
interested parties.7
The evolution of anti-corruption initiatives in a country  
Which particular anti-corruption initiatives evolve in a given country will depend on many factors, 
including the will to enforce formal anti-corruption initiatives and possible opposition to the 
implementation of certain forms of formal anti-corruption control. Other factors with potentially 
decisive impacts include the capacity of local legal institutions, the quality and independence of the 
media, the existence of anti-corruption NGOs, and the strength of lobby groups opposing additional 
or stronger control mechanisms. 
 
Since a legal system is unlikely to be able to enforce the law completely, and given the different 
variables in play, many of which are subjected to controversy, the fight against corruption requires a 
combination of different approaches. For instance, debates about corruption and the responsibility 
of agents to avert such crime are important in evoking moral attitudes, thereby making corruption 
less acceptable. Publicity about the negative consequences of corruption and information campaigns 
will often be necessary to establish general support for investigation and prosecution.8  
 
There is limited information about the efficiency of various initiatives, however, and it is not 
possible to single out the most efficient combination of anti-corruption efforts for any given 
country.  What one can do is to point out aspects that seem to be important in understanding the 
potential impacts of particular initiatives.  
The challenge of developing efficient anti-corruption initiatives  
According to the literature on criminal law, the prevalence of unwanted behaviour can be reduced 
either by increasing sanctions, through formal changes in the regulations, or by increasing the risk 
of detection, through better enforcement of existing regulations, which is a practical matter, and not 
a formal procedure.   
 
Economic incentive theory suggests that an agent calculates the expected payoffs of corruption. 
Specifically, the agent is assumed to gauge the benefits of corruption, such as the size of the bribe 
or of the amount embezzled, versus the risk of being caught and the ensuing sanctions and other 
more market-related losses. Sanctions might include fines, imprisonment, dismissal and associated 
loss of income, as well as informal sanctions, such as injury to reputation. The agent chooses 
corruption over honest conduct when, in such a calculation, the benefits outweigh the risks.9  The 
implication of this theory is that the level of corruption can be reduced by decreasing the benefits, 
or by increasing the risks associated with such activity, or both. 
 
                                                     
7  This is one of the reasons why Transparency International’s “Integrity Pact” methodology is not a good answer.  The 
methodology, which is restricted to specific public contracting situations and includes only limited sets of interested firms, 
might induce distrust among those that are not allowed to participate.  
8  The Tanzanian Competition Authority The Fair Competition Commission has started to establish consumer groups to 
increase the general understanding of the impacts of unfair competition on prices and products. One of the reasons for this 
initiative is to avoid negative reactions towards surprise operations in large firms conducted to confiscate proof. In the 
Philippines the conviction of former President Joseph Estrada for corruption was presented by the authorities in a very 
careful way to avoid demonstrations, since he still enjoys substantial support, particularly among poorer parts of the 
population, despite the crime he has committed.  
9 Some relevant references: Andvig and Moene (1991), Aidt (2003), Bardhan (1997), Søreide (2007).  
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When it comes to the real world, however, these suggestions are often very difficult to implement. 
The factors believed to influence such crime, i.e. the revenues for those involved, the risk of being 
apprehended, and the ensuing sanctions, are difficult to regulate. Decreasing the benefits of 
involvement in corruption is difficult given the secrecy involved in a corrupt transaction. Besides, a 
bribe is targeted at the personal economy of the person making the decision. The amounts involved 
may be very small when compared to the financial value of the decision being “bought” through 
corruption. Increasing the risk associated with the involvement in corruption is also a challenge. 
The risk is determined by the probability of being caught multiplied by the consequences thereof. 
Hence, even when those apprehended can expect to incur very high penalties, the impact on the risk 
is negligible if the probability of being caught is microscopic. 
 
It is very difficult to increase the probability of being sanctioned for involvement in corruption. 
Even if suspicions appear justified, corruption is extremely hard to prove. As a result, very few 
cases of corruption ever come to court, including in countries where corruption is known to be 
prevalent.10 Developing anti-corruption strategies is thus a complicated assignment. Given the 
difficulties of controlling corruption through disincentives, the use of alternative initiatives, notably 
prevention and voluntary initiatives, would seem more appropriate. However, the impact of “softer” 
initiatives is also uncertain. 
Voluntary anti-corruption initiatives in the private sector  
Voluntary anti-corruption initiatives are primarily options for individual agents – the latter are 
essentially free to make a choice if and when they find the option reasonable or rewarding. 
Consisting mainly of an encouragement to act responsibly, voluntary anti-corruption initiatives 
tend not to take full account of the factors that more directly influence agents’ incentives. 
Unless they include some form of independent monitoring of managerial processes (such as 
public procurement, tax collecting, customs, license-granting etc.), the results of voluntary ant-
corruption initiatives in terms of changing corporate behavior will be modest.  
Initiatives by firms (for internal use), versus on firms (as players in a market)  
The more general problem with anti-corruption initiatives can be contrasted to voluntary initiatives 
initiated internally in firms, when the top management decides (i.e. voluntarily) to introduce forced 
compliance systems within the company to reduce fraud and kickbacks. For company employees, 
these initiatives will often have the same force as laws and externally enforced control mechanisms, 
and will thus have an impact on their incentives. At least in theory, the prevalence of corruption in 
the company bureaucracy (for instance in relation to its own acquisition of goods and services in the 
private market) is expected to decrease as a result. These systems can have an impact on the 
company culture, depending on how forcefully they are enforced. 
 
Whether this impact extends to the top management’s inclination to participate in corruption in 
order to win contracts is uncertain. Many of the last decade’s cases on corruption, such as those 
involving Enron, Siemens, Exxon and Norwegian Statoil, point to the fact that internal codes of 
conduct may fall short when it comes to top management and how it conducts business on behalf of 
the company. High moral values will not necessarily prevent business leaders from involvement in 
corruption since their ethical choices will depend on where they place their loyalty, whether on 
                                                     
10 The relationship between the prevalence of corruption and the number of court cases is unclear. One would obvioulsy 
expect more cases being brought to court where corruption is more prevalent. On the other hand, we also know that 
intrinsic corruption may hinder that cases are being brought to court. The number of court cases will sometimes be an 
indicator of the general willingness to sanction such crime, but never an indicator of the prevalence of corruption in a 
country.  
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company profitability (including the protection of employees) or the welfare of the society at 
large.11  
 
It would be naïve to think that all American (listed) firms adopt Ethics Codes because of a moral 
imperative. More likely, most do so because they must be able to show that their employees and 
agents were duly informed that they should not bribe. If this requirement is not complied with, the 
CEO can be held responsible under American law (Sarbanes-Oxley) for bribery committed by an 
agent/employee. In other words, not informing the employees/agents carries a high risk to the actor 
responsible. 
 
It is also worth noting that corruption is unlawful in most, if not all, countries. Thus, a firms’ claim, 
in their codes of conduct, that they will not be involved in corruption to win contracts can be seen as 
a degradation of the law.  It is needless to say that we will not rob a bank, and similarly, it should be 
needless to inform about intentions of an honest business conduct. 
 
Hence, while the existence of internal compliance systems in firms can be important, the impact of 
codes of conduct is uncertain when it comes to the way firms gain contracts.  To be effective, these 
procedures have to be supported by external monitoring efforts and enforcement. Voluntary 
integrity pacts, for instance, are not sufficient to address the problem.12
Voluntary initiatives as part of an anti-corruption programme 
Voluntary initiatives are sometimes introduced as a response to the difficulties of introducing State-
sponsored formal anti-corruption programmes, and in this sense can be seen as second-best 
solutions. When formal prevention and control mechanisms are not achievable (for political or 
practical reasons), agents are at least actively encouraged to respect the law. This approach might be 
an instrumental step towards achieving more formal mechanisms in time, by serving to increase 
awareness of the importance of anti-corruption. Communication about corruption is often discussed 
as a significant factor in fostering more honest business practice.13
 
When it comes to the question of protecting markets from the influences of corruption, governments 
should work towards state-controlled formal initiatives, such as enacting regulations, optimizing 
competitive conditions, enforcing existing regulations, improving monitoring opportunities, 
allowing investigation units to operate independently, and reducing bottlenecks in the court system. 
 
What we observe as a general trend, however, is that many anti-corruption campaigners, donors as 
well as governments, prioritize voluntary initiatives, without even trying to get more formal 
mechanisms established. According to Kolstad, Fritz and O’Neil (2007), who conducted a thorough 
analysis of anti-corruption programmes in several countries, the importance of the underlying 
incentives among agents involved in corruption is very much neglected in anti-corruption 
campaigns. Limited knowledge about the efficiency of different anti-corruption initiatives might 
explain this result. A more likely explanation, however, is the relative practical convenience of 
setting up voluntary initiatives. Such initiatives are far easier to establish than legal enforcement 
since they require only a very limited number of adherents and avoid the far more daunting 
challenge of changing a country’s institutional and managerial environment. Political factions, 
firms, agents, and lobby groups almost always lend their vocal support to voluntary initiatives, 
                                                     
11 Rose-Ackerman (2002). 
12 An Integrity Pact is a voluntary agreement around a given public tender whereby all public officials and all firms 
participating in the competition promise to avoid corruption. For a critical assessment of the Integrity Pact methodology, 
see Weber Abramo (2003b).  
13 Hass, Mazzi and Leary (2007) discuss the importance of communication in association with infrastructure projects.  
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whereas support for and involvement in in-depth institutional and managerial reforms are much 
harder to come by. 
 
Nevertheless, the potential contribution voluntary initiatives can make in terms of bolstering an 
anti-corruption strategy should not be underestimated. Our concern is that voluntary initiatives, 
codes of conduct, self-regulation, and encouraged self-imposed transparency, often replace or divert 
attention from anti-corruption initiatives aimed at the whole of society. The introduction of a range 
of voluntary initiatives can easily give the impression that ‘something is being done’ about 
corruption.  An emphasis on voluntary efforts therefore carries the risk that the design and 
implementation of more vital anti-corruption actions will be delayed.  
And so, what works? 
Most countries would benefit from a stronger emphasis on formal regulation, forced transparency 
via the enactment of access to information laws, close monitoring of decision-making processes, 
opening up of public markets via reform of public procurement regulations and other reforms – that 
is, measures that act on the objective circumstances favoring corruption. The question of 
involvement in corruption should be considered part of companies’ CSR strategy only insofar as it 
is understood that such types of voluntary initiatives would be subsidiary to more generic state-
sponsored actions aimed at the whole of society as embodied by the State. Likewise, anti-corruption 
NGOs that focus their efforts on voluntary initiatives miss the fact that corruption is not a 
phenomenon amenable to localized remedies, but rather reflect dysfunctions that should primarily 
be addressed at the level of the State. Initiatives to reduce corruption should – as far as possible – 
focus on ways of diminishing externally given opportunities for such crime, and not rely primarily 
on agents’ moral values or disincentives to be involved.  
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3. Anti-corruption initiatives in Brazil 
Brazil is a signatory to all relevant anti-corruption international conventions: The Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] Convention from 1997 (which provides for legal 
means for Brazilian firms and/or their representatives to be prosecuted in Brazil if accused of 
paying bribes abroad); the Organization of American States [OAS] Convention  from 1996 (which 
is much broader than the OECD Convention, covering many fields with direct impact on the 
domestic environment) and the recent United Nations Anti-Corruption Convention insert date 
(whose breadth is similar, although not identical, to that of the OAS). 14
 
With respect to the formal requirements of these three Conventions, Brazil is virtually fully 
compliant. Studies show that the country has successfully changed its legislation to conform to the 
provisions of the OECD and OAS Conventions. No study aimed at formal compliance was yet 
made concerning the UN Convention, but since the latter does not significantly depart from the 
OAS Convention with regard to the legal framework, essential compliance with that Convention 
can be expected (the principal addition the UN Convention makes to the OAS Convention concerns 
regulations regarding the repatriation of stolen assets, a matter on which the Brazilian laws are 
mainly compliant).15
 
As well as promulgating the legal instruments required by the Conventions, Brazil has been 
gradually building better ways of preventing and combating corruption at the Federal level, as well 
as reinforcing pre-existing institutions and organizations. Although the Federal government does 
not include an overarching anti-corruption agency with full normative authority over the Executive 
branch, such function has been partially covered by the General Comptroller’s Office (CGU), the 
organization responsible for the Federal government’s internal control. Several initiatives 
formalized as decrees (not requiring legislative approval) as well as new laws (submitted to 
Congress for discussion and approval) have been developed by the CGU, often aided by the Council 
for Transparency and Combating Corruption, a forum that brings together representatives from both 
State bodies and civil society.  For example, in 2006 the government submitted to Congress a new 
bill drafted by the CGU and the Council for Transparency designed to regulate conflicts of interest 
and post-public employment at the Federal Executive level; the bill is still to be discussed by 
Congress.  
 
Other institutions have also been active in combating corruption in Brazil. The Federal Police has 
conducted numerous operations against criminal organizations involved in corruption and fraud and 
the Public Ministry (public prosecutor’s office) has systematically brought charges against persons 
accused of corruption.  
Anti-corruption in a decentralized state 
The implementation by the Federal government of anti-corruption initiatives is a poor guide to the 
situation in the country’s 26 states (plus the Federal District, which counts as a 27th state) and 5,651 
municipalities. The difficulties of combating corruption in Brazil are compounded by the country’s 
unusually – in international terms – high degree of decentralization.16 The effects of 
                                                     
14 Brazil and Norway are also signatories to the 1958 New York Convention (Convention on the Recognition   and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards) a foundation instrument of international arbitration. See 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html 
15 See Weber Abramo (2003a) and the follow-up report, Baracui (2006). Concerning the OECD Convention, see Weber 
Abramo (2007a).  
16  For a historical depiction of the tradition of decentralization in Brazil, see Willis et. al. (1999). 
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decentralization on governance in Brazil are often portrayed negatively: “In the area of 
intergovernmental relations, excessive decentralization was deemed to have disorganized sectoral 
public policies and caused more inefficiency”.17 Every state and municipality in Brazil is fully 
responsible for planning, executing and controlling its expenditures. Given Brazil’s well-known 
regional inequalities, most towns and some states lag behind the Federal standards of financial 
control. 
 
This fact has been highlighted by audits carried out by the CGU in municipalities that conduct 
Federal government budgetary programmes under agreements with specific Ministries. (These 
“voluntary” agreements, as they are called, correspond to only a small percentage of the 
municipalities’ and states’ expenditures; since they are “voluntary”, they allow for external control, 
which is why the CGU is able to audit the proceedings.) According to the CGU, irregularities were 
found in more than 90% of these agreements, and serious irregularities were found in almost 60% of 
them.18
 
The situation has prompted the CGU to suggest modifications in the control requirements imposed 
by the Federal Ministries on states and municipalities wishing to participate in the “voluntary” 
programmes. Proposed changes include electronic auctions to conduct tenders and standardized 
accounts registry mechanisms.  
Firms’ perspectives on corruption in Brazil  
Judging from the available evidence, private firms operating in Brazil (whether domestically or 
foreign-owned) hold more pessimistic than optimistic opinions about the extent to which corruption 
affects business in the country. 
 
A survey of 78 private firms conducted in 2003 by Transparência Brasil and Kroll showed that 
corruption was ranked in second place (after high levels of taxation) among fourteen perceived 
obstacles to the development of the private sector.19 Another investigation, sponsored by 
Transparência Brasil, the World Bank and the municipality of São Paulo, among firms based in that 
city, also ranked corruption as the second most important (after violence) of eight obstacles.20
 
Besides collecting the opinions of private firms’ representatives about various aspects of the 
relationship between the State and society, both surveys also attempted to assess actual experiences 
with bribery arising from different types of interactions. In the TBrasil/Kroll survey, about half the 
firms declared that they participate or tried to participate in public tenders. Among those, 62% said 
that they had been asked for bribes. Concerning taxation and other dues, 53% of firms reported 
having been subjected to requests for bribes or other indirect payments. State taxes, as opposed to 
municipal and federal ones, were identified as the most vulnerable to corrupt practices.   
 
Of course, opinions about corruption reported in surveys cannot be taken as a measure of the actual 
phenomenon of corruption. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to separate the objective factors 
that might produce such opinions from the subjective factors arising from general feelings and 
hearsay. Surveying actual experiences can give better insights into the empirical situations 
experienced by firms, but even so it would be difficult to generalise without knowing how 
representative the collected data are. 
 
                                                     
17 Melo and Rezende (2004). 
18 See reports in www.cgu.gov.br. 
19 Weber Abramo (2003c). 
20 Speck and Weber Abramo (2003). 
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Nonetheless, expressed opinions cannot be dismissed as fictions.  They must be taken seriously as 
an objective rendition of a certain attitude of mind, regardless of their basis in fact.  All 
governments must take (some) account of opinion because trust (or distrust) is an important element 
in determining the failure or success of official initiatives and programmes in many fields. 
Firms wish to combat corruption  
In respect of expressed opinion, it is interesting to observe that a high percentage of firms surveyed 
stated that, at least in principle, they would be willing to spend money to reduce corruption. The 
question was specifically asked in the São Paulo survey, with the result that 34% declared that they 
would do so, with varying amounts of money.  This suggests that initiatives to promote 
collaboration between State institutions and private firms, with a view to reducing the risk of 
corruption in state-business interactions, would receive significant support from private firms. 
 
Another indication that firms are willing to combat corruption comes from the adoption of internal 
norms aimed at avoiding involvement in illegal acts. Most transnational firms in particular have 
adopted ethics codes that explicitly prohibit employees from engaging in bribery. For firms based in 
countries that subscribe to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions, claiming to enforce such internal regulations has become a 
necessity. 
 
The trend to institute an internal environment in which corruption is at least formally condemned 
was clearly reflected in the TBrasil/Kroll survey.  78% of the respondent firms had adopted (in 
2003) an internal ethics code explicitly prohibiting the payment of bribes to public officials. At the 
same time, however, 21% of these same firms stated that their managerial policies implicitly 
recognize the fact of bribery, and hence that they in some way have to adjust to their business 
environment.  
 
This supports our argument made above that the adoption of an ethics code by a firm is not 
sufficient to prevent its involvement in bribery. At the very least, internal regulations must be 
actively enforced by the firm to take effect. 
Response when victimized by corruption 
One sign that internal regulations per se mean little is found in responses to a sub-set of questions in 
the TBrasil/Kroll survey that tried to pinpoint steps respondent firms had taken to confront actual 
cases of corruption. 
 
About half the firms (56%) maintained an internal mechanism (hotline or equivalent) enabling 
people to denounce cases of corruption. Most of these (89%) claimed to protect such whistleblowers 
from retaliation. However, when asked how many reported cases of corruption had been 
subsequently investigated and denounced, there was no significant difference in frequency among 
firms that maintained such mechanisms and those that did not (32% vs. 30%). Nor did the existence 
of an ethics code prohibiting bribery correlate significantly with reported cases. In fact, firms 
without an ethics code reported more internal cases (32%) than those with such a code (20%). A 
total of 14% of firms declared that employees have been punished for having taken part in acts of 
bribery.  
 
The Transparência Brasil/Kroll survey also highlighted the important fact that firms participating in 
public tenders mostly do not appeal to the authorities when they suspect that they have lost business 
due to competitors paying bribes to public officials who took the relevant decisions. Although the 
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Brazilian regulations provide ample opportunity for appealing against a decision, either through 
administrative processes or before a court of law, firms usually do not exercise these prerogatives. 
Only 23% of the firms had administratively contested a decision, 5% had appealed to the Audit 
Institution (the external control body, one at Federal level and one for each state21) and 5% had 
appealed to the courts. 
 
In other words, most firms appear not to defend their rights when confronted with decisions that 
they consider doubtful. In principle, economic rationality would compel a firm to appeal when 
faced with a decision that wrongfully harmed its interests. So, either economic rationality does not 
fully function in such situations or other rational factors intervene. Although the TBrasil/Kroll 
survey did not further pursue this issue, the most common justification given by a firm for not 
defending its rights is a reluctance to appear hostile to clients and competitors. Fear of retaliation 
would accordingly be the rational factor in a firm’s decision not to defend its rights.22
 
In Brazil, firms are sometimes heard to complain’ of receiving unfavourable treatment from the 
authorities because they have contested earlier administrative decisions. However, there is no 
statistically robust and objective evidence available to determine whether exercising the right to 
appeal subsequently harms a firm’s interests or not. 
 
To encourage firms to report perceived cases of corruption, it is important for them to have 
confidence in the ability of the authorities both to investigate the crime and to ensure that the firm 
making the allegation will not suffer penalties in the future. Collaboration between governments to 
prevent and combat corruption can play a significant role in fostering such trust. 
 
                                                     
21 A few municipalities also have such “Audit Courts”, as they are called. Despite the name, they are not part of the 
Judicial system. 
22 From hearsay – as far as the present authors are aware, no empirical investigation of the issue was conducted in Brazil. 
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4. Norway and Norwegian firms in Brazil 
Norway scores well on international perception-based corruption rankings and has been 
commended by OECD for its implementation of that organization’s anti-corruption Convention.23 
Cross-border corruption has rarely been detected, yet Norway is one of the few countries to have 
brought cases to court on the basis of this convention.24. Nevertheless, it is impossible from such 
information to accurately describe or generalize about the business practices of Norwegian firms. 
Since corruption is very difficult to detect and prosecute, and since the quality of legal institutions 
vary significantly across countries, we cannot make assumptions about the business practices of 
Norwegian firms overseas on the basis of the number of cases that come to court in Norway.  
 
What we do know is that Norwegian industry is outward-oriented and well exposed to international 
attitudes and business cultures. We also know that its most important sectors of operation are 
among those described by Transparency International’s Bribe Payers Index 2002 as those most 
exposed to corruption: oil and gas, power transmission, and construction. In addition, Norwegian 
firms are present in many of the most challenging markets, in terms of rankings on various business 
climate indicators. There are therefore grounds for questioning their ability to operate according to 
domestic and international laws and regulations, including in Brazil.  
 
There are some counter-forces that may decrease the potential of Norwegian firms to become 
involved in corruption. The role of Norwegian industry in cross-border corruption is widely debated 
in the Norwegian business press.25 Cases attract considerable attention, and this is in itself a 
potential deterrent against corruption. The Norwegian Authority for Investigation and Prosecution 
of Economic and Environmental Crime (Økokrim) tends to follow up on signals or suspicions of 
economic crime and appears sufficiently independent.26  
 
Even more important for many firms, however, is the attitude of the most important business 
organization in Norway, the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO). This organization 
began addressing the issue of anti-corruption very early, during the 1990s, and has continuously 
underscored the responsibilities of individual firms. It has organized several conferences, the first in 
2000, focusing on the risk of becoming involved in corruption and the negative consequences for 
Norwegian firms in general if individual firms are found to be involved. These initiatives have 
motivated many firms to develop their own strategies to avoid involvement in corruption.  
Interviews with representatives of Norwegian firms in Brazil 
There are no reported cases of corruption involving Norwegian firms operating in Brazil. Does this 
mean that Norwegian firms are not involved in bribery or related forms of inappropriate business 
practice?  As in any other environment, the absence of reported cases is not the same thing as the 
absence of cases. The TBrasil/Kroll survey reveals a significant prevalence of such problems in 
Brazil. The presence of Norwegian firms in this market implies that corruption must be an issue for 
                                                     
23 Although there are no obvious reasons to expect perception-based corruption indices to inform very much about actual 
levels of corruption. See e.g. Weber Abramo (2007b). For the OECD evaluation, see OECD (2004). 
24 For cases on the OECD Convention on corruption, see Heimann et. al. (2005), (2006) and (2007). 
25 The newspaper Dagens Næringsliv, devoted to business news, has been perhaps the most important wachdog on 
corruption in Norway and their active journalism has resulted in several cases being brought to court (www.dn.no).  
26 This independence was recently debated in the media. For instance, the huge revenues the Norwegian state receives as a 
result of oil concessions in foreign markets may challenge the independence of a national investigating body: Will there 
be sufficient incentives to investigate the award of these concessions? There is no specific reason to think otherwise, yet 
there is awareness of this potential conflict of interest  (Dagens Næringsliv, Oct. 22 and Oct. 24 2007 ). 
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them. In order to gain some insights into their experiences in this respect, we conducted a small 
qualitative study for this project. 18 interviews were conducted by Tina Søreide in August 2007. 
The respondents included executives of Norwegian firms’ subsidiaries in Brazil, representatives of 
Brazilian firms, Brazilian lawyers, and a few other actors with knowledge about the Brazilian 
business climate. Innovation Norway, the Norwegian export agency, contributed by facilitating the 
visit. 
 
The main purpose of the interviews was to identify Norwegian firms’ perceptions of the business 
environment in Brazil, what they consider obstacles to business, and how they deal with those 
obstacles. Among the issues discussed were: entry into the Brazilian markets, competition, tender 
procedures, regulation, customs, and opportunities to respond if victimized by illegal business 
practice. Anti-corruption issues at firm and government levels were also discussed. Questions were 
phrased in ways that related to international business challenges rather than in ways that implied 
corruption was prevalent in Brazil. Most of the interviewed business leaders were reluctant to 
inform on challenges relating to corruption, including their own possible involvement in such 
practices.27 The discussions were nevertheless very useful in revealing some of the opportunities 
and potential difficulties of operating in Brazil. However, given the low number of responses, 
combined with the sensitivity of the topic, the information deriving from these interviews does not 
allow for generalizations.  It should also be noted that responses to many of the questions diverged 
substantially. As a result, the summary presented here should not be considered indicative of the 
views of the Brazilian business environment in general nor of views held by all Norwegian firms 
operating in Brazil. 
 
Although the problem of corruption was a concern for many of the business people addressed in this 
survey, it was not described by them as an everyday burden. The majority of the executives 
interviewed did not admit that corruption might be influencing their firm’s market position and did 
not think they had lost contracts as a result of such crime. These experiences are in marked contrast 
to the results of the TBrasil/Kroll survey mentioned above. The executives did express some 
frustrations regarding the different ways of doing business in Norway and Brazil, due to culture, 
regulatory framework, and market-related matters. In general, however, they found the business 
environment in Brazil to be rapidly improving and depicted a very promising market for Norwegian 
firms. 
Firms’ responsibility to collaborate on initiatives to combat corruption 
Some of the firms interviewed by Søreide will consider compliance with regulations difficult in the 
short term, although most of them recognize unquestionable benefits in the long run. They 
expressed an understanding for the fact that collaboration on anti-corruption between the 
Norwegian and Brazilian governments will be strengthened if a majority of the firms supports the 
initiatives. For instance, the more representatives of Norwegian firms realize that a failure to 
comply with regulations entails a risk to the reputation of other Norwegian firms in the market; the 
stronger collaboration on anti-corruption measures between the Norwegian and Brazilian 
governments is likely to become. This is an attitude that can not be taken for granted, however, 
since Norwegian firms are partly competing against one another, and will not necessarily be 
concerned about their own individual reputation - especially if corrupt practices can put them in a 
competitive lead. The respondents expressed a clear willingness to support anti-corruption 
initiatives, however, as least as long as they were being launched in a trade-promoting manner.  
                                                     
27 Some of the respondents vaguely admitted that practices that are close to corruption could have had occurred – at early 
stages of their establishment or under circumstances they would describe as extortion. For instance, because their financial 
loss would be significant if no payment was made. In general, however, the firms would never pay bribes, and they had 
codes of conduct and training to help them prevent cases.  
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By including questions on various business-climate challenges, the interviews proved useful in 
understanding where firms’ compliance systems were being challenged, i.e. to identify the 
situations where some firms sometimes find it difficult to act in accordance with Brazilian law. 
These are exactly the situations where a particular awareness of the risks of becoming involved in 
bribery and strict professionalism might have a positive influence on the business environment.  
 
 
The role of agents 
To understand the activity of Norwegian firms in Brazil, we should also consider their main 
facilitators, primarily their consultancies or agents and the Norwegian export agency (Innovation 
Norway). These actors share the interests of Norwegian firms, they are expected to assist Norwegian 
entrants in many different ways, and they will sometimes be informed about or asked to give advice on 
business climate challenges, including corruption.  
Prior to the OECD anti-bribery convention or the UN convention, it was quite common for firms to 
hire local agents to smooth the entry process by offering bribes (to customs, regulators, and 
politicians). Since the OECD convention and other legal improvements, the use of an intermediary no 
longer frees the firm from responsibility for acts committed on their behalf.  
Agents, mostly professional consultants, are still used. There are reasons to believe that some of them 
are asked to handle obstacles to trade, such as bottlenecks in the customs, tax system, or regulations, 
even if that might involve informal payments. These practices impede progress in the area of 
preventing corruption. Although many firms have policies and compliance systems that prohibit 
“under the table” payments, more efforts are needed to eliminate tolerance of these practices. Hence, 
while professional expertise, like lawyers, accountants and engineers, might be useful and even 
decisive for the success of entry, agents hired primarily to handle obstacles in informal ways should 
never be used. 
A survey of Norwegian exporters, presented below, included a smaller survey of Norwegian 
embassies. Twenty-four of the Norwegian embassies outside the OECD area responded to a 
questionnaire on corruption and how they would advise Norwegian firms on such matters. A clear 
majority described the business climate in their country of residence as challenging, and assumed that 
foreign companies who conducted business honestly could lose out.  Most of them would never advise 
Norwegian firms to adopt business practices that would be unacceptable in Norway. Nevertheless, five 
of the embassy representatives would make such a suggestion, and a few others expressed uncertainty. 
The survey was conducted in 2004 and attitudes and practices may have changed since due to 
significant debate and attention to the issues. 
In this respect, the Norwegian export agency might play an important role, by emphasizing why 
reliance on agents to solve obstacles to entry in informal ways is unacceptable.  
 
Business responses to corruption: entry, taxation, and the court system 
Entry to Brazilian markets was described by the Norwegian firms surveyed as challenging, yet they 
attributed this more to regulation and taxation than to the challenge of getting contracts. According 
to one respondent, “Brazil is one of the most complicated markets to get established”. Another 
stated that “entry to Brazil is expensive, but promising if things are done right”. This refers to the 
selection of business partners, which is very important in Brazil as elsewhere. Some firms try to 
benefit from using less expensive agents, namely, consultants with few qualifications other than 
knowledge about how to get firms established. As pointed out by another firm: “It is critically 
important to establish contact with truly professional environments, and not make use of the first 
agent who wants to assist you”. 
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According to one CEO, “many firms misunderstand the Brazilian business culture”. Some others 
pointed to a “Brazilian way” of handling difficulties, implying a propensity in the country’s 
business environment to circumvent regulations. This might reflect ambivalence or confusion 
within the attitude of particular firms about how best to accommodate business practices when 
challenges occur.  
 
 
‘The Brazilian way’   
“The Brazilian way” (jeitinho brasileiro) is an expression that describes an alleged special 
propensity of Brazilians to bend or circumvent rules.  One would apply the “Brazilian way” to tax 
avoidance, to avoid waiting in line for the delivery of a service and a multitude of other situations 
where some kind of written or unwritten rule is disobeyed. However, the expression can also be used 
to imply positive aspects of the Brazilian attitude, notably flexibility and readiness to adapt.1  
The notion that there exists a “Brazilian way” of dealing with rules or expected behaviours goes 
beyond a simple statistical discovery that Brazilians bend rules. It refers to an ingrained cultural trait 
that allegedly permeates the relationship of the average Brazilian with all institutions. Adopting the 
“Brazilian way” is a part of being an average Brazilian. Or so goes the belief. 
The basic flaw in the idea that Brazilians exhibit a special propensity to disobey rules or bend them 
to their own benefit is that it assumes that bending rules is not present (in some degree) in other 
societies.2  
Recent academic attempts to examine the alleged propensity using surveys and statistical methods3 
are limited to samples of Brazilians. Since they did not compare the data from Brazil with data 
collected among members of other cultures, they do not broach the central tenet that Brazilians are 
special in that regards.  Those empirical investigations are useful to help understand how widespread 
the cultural acceptance of rule-bending behaviours is among Brazilians (which is seemingly high), 
but they cast no light on the matter of whether there exist a distinctive “Brazilian way”.  
There is no empirical reason to believe that, all other factors being equal, Norwegians (or citizens of 
other countries) are less prone to bend rules than Brazilians. 
 
1 Barbosa (1995).  
2 Barbosa also notes the existence of similar social mechanisms in other societies (such as the “chtara” among 
the working class in Algeria). 
3 The leading academic commentator on the “Brazilian way” is the anthropologist Roberto da Matta (Notre 
Dame University), who has frequently written about the issue. More recently, Alberto Carlos Almeida, a 
political scientist from the Fundação Getúlio Vargas, has conducted empirical surveys about the “Brazilian 
way”. See his book A Cabeça do Brasileiro (The Brazilian’s Mind), 2007. 
 
According to one of the Brazilian experts interviewed, the entry challenges are very similar for all 
foreigners regardless of nationality, although there seem to be some patterns in how the different 
firms respond to these challenges. Some of the interviewees assumed that the risk of corruption is 
particularly high during the entry period. It is not only easier to make mistakes because the market 
and local partners are unfamiliar but it is also deemed crucial to acquire needed information about 
the markets and tender procedures.  In addition, it is essential not to fail to deliver on the first 
contract, for instance, because of bottlenecks in Customs. Two interviewees actually admitted that 
their firms had been involved in some form of undue business practice to get established in Brazil, 
despite their explicit anti-corruption policy. Another interviewee said he would expect that firms 
with strong internal compliance rules to take longer to get established, indicating that such rules 
would prevent illegal shortcuts. We were also told that the better technically qualified a firm is, the 
easier it is for it to avoid corruption. 
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Taxation 
Complaints from the private sector about the tax burden are common in Brazil. Many firms viewed 
the Brazilian system as particularly demanding. As a result, it was claimed, a firm’s competitiveness 
will sometimes depend on its “skills on strategic tax planning” – while the importance of 
“implementing business in tax-efficient manners” was underscored. A few firms even claimed that 
informal sales by competitors had driven them out of a segment of the market. These are areas 
where firms might be challenged, yet all the firms seemed far more concerned with correct payment 
of taxes, and not tax avoidance. 28  
Response and the court system 
Among the few firms who claimed to be victims of corruption, the inclination to respond in any 
formal way was minuscule. The attitudes expressed by the firms clearly point to a lack of trust not 
only in the judicial system but also in the attitudes of their clients when confronted with challenges 
to their decisions. Filing complaints on tender procedures or in courts is considered “a fuzz”, 
“risky”, “expensive”, “wasted” – and an act that might lead to negative attention. Most firms seem 
to prefer to stay silent about corruption, even if such crime has cost them important contracts. This 
is an area where attitudes should be changed. The potential impact on the business environment of 
complaining – formally – and bringing cases to court might be significant. 
Anti-corruption initiatives 
When asked about anti-corruption initiatives, most of the firms noted the importance of compliance 
practices. Firm representatives did not seem overly naïve on this issue, however. They indicated 
clearly that a country manager’s main objective is to win contracts, and that training is needed to 
incorporate codes of conduct into the firm’s decision-making. When it came to government 
initiatives, many respondents pointed to the need to standardize required documentation, simplify 
rules, improve and follow up on regulation, privatize some public services, and ease communication 
with the bureaucracy. Several respondents noted the role of the independent Brazilian media in 
reporting on corruption cases. 
 
Although the interviews provided limited information about the actual practices of Norwegian firms 
in Brazil, the views and experience of Norwegian firms operating in foreign markets at large were 
surveyed in another investigation, to which we now turn.  
Norwegian firms in foreign markets – a business survey  
In 2004, another effort was made to obtain more information about Norwegian firms’ attitudes to 
and involvement in corruption when operating abroad. A survey including approximately 100 
questions on corruption was responded by 82 Norwegian executives with significant international 
business experience. NHO encouraged and collaborated on this initiative, although it was an 
independent research project. 29  
 
Most of the respondents to this survey described corruption as a significant challenge affecting their 
foreign operations. In fact, two-thirds of the firms claimed to have lost an important contract 
because of corruption, and more than 40% believed that tender conditions were sometimes tailored 
to favor the offer from a particular company. Many of the firms had experienced challenges in 
                                                     
28 For more on taxation issues in the context of foreign direct investment in Brazil, see Motta Veiga (2004). 
29 Also this study was conducted by Tina Søreide. For more information about results, see Søreide (2006).  
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relation to local business partners: for instance, when such partners offered illegal payments on 
behalf of a partnership without informing the leading firm. 
 
Another difficulty concerned whether to act on suspicions that competitors had offered bribes or 
that tender rules had been violated. A clear majority of respondents stated that they would not report 
the case, even if they were convinced that corruption had occurred.30
 
Few firms revealed involvement in corruption. The most common form of involvement was 
facilitation payments, i.e. informal payments offered ‘to get things done’ – usually bureaucratic 
services. Half the respondents said that they never make “irregular payments to get things done,” 24 
percent said they seldom do so, and 17 percent admitted that they sometimes or frequently make 
this kind of payment. The reported sizes of facilitation payments varied, but there was no clear link 
between the size of these reported payments and the size of the responding firms. Almost half of the 
respondents who paid facilitation payments said that they had no problems in abiding by the 
regulations. 
 
The respondents were also asked if it is necessary to offer valuable gifts or pay bribes to clients, 
directly or through an agent, in order to be able to operate in certain countries. 27% reported finding 
that gifts or bribes were required, with nine percent admitting to have agreed to a request from an 
agent, an adviser, or a consultant for money that would most likely be used for bribery.  Another six 
percent said that they probably had agreed to such a request at some time. A few firms admitted that 
during the last decade they had obtained a contract, a license, or a concession in a way that they 
deemed important to keep confidential. Large firms were more challenged than smaller firms, and 
also revealed less trust in their competitors’ business practices. Firms exposed to competitive 
pressure were no less inclined to be challenged by corruption, even if fair competition is often seen 
as force against corruption.  
 
The results of this 2004 survey of Norwegian exporters points to a prevalence of business 
corruption in markets where Norwegian firms operate, and reveals that many Norwegian firms are 
in fact challenged by the problem. Further, it showed that some Norwegian firms have been 
involved in illegal practices, despite a good ranking of Norway in corruption indices and despite the 
stated disinclination of firms to take part in such arrangements. 
 
The combination of results from the interviews with business people in Brazil and this anonymous 
business survey of Norwegian exporters produce the most realistic if still limited picture to date of 
Norwegian firms and their attitudes to and potential involvement in corruption in Brazilian markets.  
 
                                                     
30 When asked to explain how they move on after cases where corruption has cost them contracts, 24% of the firms 
reported that ‘they would adjust their strategies to the local business culture’ while 28% responded ‘no big reaction, 
corruption is part of the game’. Only 5% would leave the country under those circumstances, and 13% would report the 
problem through alternative channels, for instance through political channels.  
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5 A programme for collaboration 
Collaboration on anti-corruption entails establishing a common platform for dialogue and defining 
suitable fields where joint efforts are worth pursuing. An obvious criterion for selecting such fields 
is the economic impact of the envisaged results. Another is the broad institutional effect the 
particular initiative might achieve. We now turn to some areas where collaboration can be 
particularly fruitful. It should be noted that we do not intend to cover all the areas where 
collaboration and dialogue is possible.  
Customs regulation and procedures  
Any firm (Brazilian or foreign) importing finished products or components into Brazil has contact 
with Customs authorities. Freeing an import with Customs is a process necessarily involving 
bureaucratic procedures that, in any country, are notoriously prone to manipulation. 
 
During the interviews conducted in Brazil, Customs was the area most frequently referred to as a 
challenge. Complex bureaucratic regulations and slow procedures were described as a source of 
corruption. Nonetheless, many Norwegian firms pointed to improvements in this domain - a view 
supported by the latest World Bank’s Business Environment Report, which cites important reforms 
in Brazil.31
 
Nevertheless, a significant share of the Norwegian firms interviewed for this project revealed 
uncertainty about how to handle delays at Brazilian customs. One firm complained that “bribes are 
not demanded but problems are created, because the officials know that time is far more valuable 
for the firms than it is for them”. This might mean that, although bribes are not explicitly requested, 
some kind of facilitation payment is expected. To prevent ‘problems’ being ‘created’, another firm 
operated very strict internal checks on all bureaucratic formalities, including in relation to Customs: 
“we control all our paper work four times”. 
 
According to one firm, “It can be difficult to avoid paying bribes in customs”, while another 
claimed that “strikes in harbours are a big challenge, which sometimes is solved by corruption – or 
by letting intermediaries solve the problem”. 
 
Since difficulties at Customs have a potentially high impact (directly and indirectly) both on firms’ 
costs and on the finished product’s final prices, it would be of benefit to all concerned to avoid as 
much as possible the creation of artificially-induced bottlenecks. Importing firms are in a privileged 
position when it comes to suggesting ways to streamline the Customs procedure, and they could be 
encouraged to participate in a permanent forum, sponsored by the Brazilian government, 
specifically dedicated to the issue.32 The Federal government has been sympathetic towards such 
concerns. Thus, the Internal Revenue Secretary (Secretaria da Receita Federal) of the Finance 
Ministry opened dialogue channels with Procomex, a business-sponsored organization dedicated to 
the issue. This led to fruitful discussion of measures to enhance the efficiency of the Customs 
procedures.33
 
                                                     
31 The World Bank (2008). For data on the business environment and reforms in Brazil, see 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Reformers/LAC.aspx
32 See Black (2005) on the importance of expertise on defining regulations.  
33 See reports at the organization’s website, www.procomex.com.br. 
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Customs is already a concern in current WTO trade negotitations (the Doha-round) on trade 
facilitation. Dialogue and initiatives between very different countries, like Brazil and Norway, on 
how to reduce corruption in Customs may prove important to bring new aspects and arguments into 
consideration, and strenghten opportunity to reach progress on this area internationally.34  
Public procurement 
The Brazilian public procurement and contracting law35 is mandatory for all public entities. 
Publicly-controlled corporations must also obey the same law – with one exception, Petrobras, 
whose procurement procedures are regulated by a special codicil.36
 
Although inefficiencies in public procurement can arise at any phase of a tender, the most crucial 
phase occurs with the definition of conditions (technical, financial etc.) of participation. This is 
when artificial barriers which might keep some firms from submitting tenders are erected. 
 
Economic theory and practice show that artificially reducing the number of participants in a given 
market results in economic disadvantages. Not only are prices kept higher than they would be if all 
potential participants were allowed to participate in the market in question, but  secondary benefits 
arising from technical advances, greater organizational efficiency, improved financial engineering 
are also diminished. In general, artificially reducing market competitiveness runs counter to both 
public and private interests. 
 
Most of the respondents to the survey conducted among Norwegian firms operating in Brazil 
described the public procurement environment as professional and generally steered towards the 
best price-quality combination. This view included Petrobras-conducted procurement, despite its 
exemption from ordinary rules. However,  respondents, Norwegian as well as Brazilian, did report 
certain irregular episodes, which included: tender criteria designed to fit a specific company, 
evaluation commissions requesting bribes in exchange for secret information about the procedure, 
information leaked with the aim of  influencing the outcome of the tender, and even one instance 
where a contract that had been awarded and signed was changed on the basis of some formal 
prerequisite, this development being presumed to have resulted from bribery. 
 
Several firms were convinced that they had lost contracts because competitors had offered bribes.  
Informal trading of confidential information about tender criteria or competitors’ bids was most 
frequently mentioned in this context. One respondent claimed that he knew that his company had 
lost a huge contract because competitors had offered bribes. However, his company did not file a 
formal complaint on the tender procedures for fear of sanctions from those involved and the 
potential loss of future contracts. This concern was shared by several of the respondents. Besides, 
tender rules were not seen as a sufficient obstacle to corruption, yet being important to ensure a fair 
selection of the winning bid. The rules were generally seen as professional enough but the 
consequences when they were not respected were believed to be too few.  
Pre-tender debate  
One way to reduce the possibility of artificial barriers being erected is to open up discussions about 
conditions of participation before the formal call for bids is made. When firms acting in a given 
market are made aware of the conditions of participating in a tender only after such conditions were 
                                                     
34 The importance of trade facilitation to reduce corruption is already emphasized in Norway’s Action Plan for Trade and 
Development, which can be downloaded on:  www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents . 
35 Law 8666/93. 
36 Decree 2745/98, according to Art. 67 of Law 9478/97.  
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already defined by the administration, the only path to try to change conditions perceived to be 
illegal or unfair is to formally complain. In the Brazilian context they can contest such conditions 
both administratively and judicially, but in practice they do not do that very often, as shown by the 
results of the Transparência Brasil/Kroll survey previously mentioned. The right to contest is mostly 
not taken up, perhaps because most firms do not want to appear to be adversarial towards their 
public clients. 
 
However, if the firms are allowed to discuss the conditions before the administration has taken 
decisions, then the adversarial component would be replaced by a collaborative endeavour aimed at 
reaching the most economically efficient set of conditions. The Brazilian regulations allow for such 
discussions to happen. In fact, in the general law (Law 8666/1993/), it is predicated that public 
tenders involving values above about US$ 50 million must be subjected to a public audience. This 
mechanism of opening conditions of tender to public discussion could be extended to situations 
where lower values are involved. Such a procedure has been adopted by the administration of the 
city of São Paulo, Brazil’s largest municipality.37 According to that regulation, the conditions for 
participating in any tender whose predicted value exceeds R$ 12 million (about US$ 6.6 million) 
must be subjected to public consultation on the Internet. The administration must provide arguments 
when turning down any suggestions that arise.38
 
As well as fulfilling the direct economic function of allowing better conditions to be formulated, the 
establishment of an explicit mechanism of discussion also has the subjective advantage of fostering 
trust between the public administration, business participants and independent observers. Of course, 
the establishment of such a mechanism must be open to all interested parties, domestic or foreign, 
and in particular cannot be limited to firms from any single country. However, engaging foreign 
governments – in our case the Norwegian authorities – in fostering participation in the mechanism 
can give a powerful boost to the credibility of the initiative. 
 
Procurement procedures and the WTO General Procurement Agreement (GPA) 
A final concern is how Norwegian-Brazilian dialogue on anti-corruption in relation to public 
procurement would complement or support international initiatives on the same issue. A significant 
international collaboration on public procurement is the WTO “Government Procurement 
Agreement” (GPA). The agreement has been referred to as an initiative that, if enforced, would 
automatically have a preventive impact on corruption as well. And similarly, reluctance against 
implementation of the GPA has sometimes been suspected to reflect protection of power 
constellations and their influence on procurement-related decisions.  
 
Norway and Brazil are countries where procurement rules are already very strict, GPA-rules are 
already implemented, or will not make much difference. Both countries are net exporters, however, 
and will benefit if the GPA becomes a real multilateral agreement, covering countries where current 
procurement regulations are weak. Dialogue on anti-corruption in procurement should thus include 
ways to strengthen this initiative internationally and from different angels.  
 
In addition, a dialogue between Norway and Brazil on this matter will be important to identify the 
weaknesses in the GPA and similar procurement rules in terms of functioning as a barrier against 
corruption. As part of a collaboration on this issue, it should be discussed how the GPA initiative 
could be strengthened to better prevent such crime.  
                                                     
37 Municipal Decree 48046/06. 
38 The economic results of this procedure, which was adopted in late 2006, are still to be evaluated. A longer time-period 
is required before prices before and after the measure was adopted can be compared. 
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Legal cooperation  
Criminal organizations and firms involved in corruption exploit the situation of the virtual absence 
of obstacles to capital movement across borders, while investigations of corruption usually are 
restricted to the legal jurisdictions within which the crime occurs. One of the goals of the OECD 
anti-bribery convention is therefore to ease investigation and prosecution.39
 
The UN Convention against Corruption strengthened this ambition, claiming in Article 1 that one of 
its main purposes is “to promote, facilitate and support international cooperation and technical 
assistance in the prevention of and fight against corruption, including in asset recovery”.  Article 5 
requires State parties to have effective, coordinated anti-corruption policies.  
 
The formal basis for legal cooperation to tackle international corruption has been significantly 
improved, and these improvements have been implemented in the national legal systems of 
signatories to the conventions. However, whether this collaboration functions in practice depends 
very much on the willingness of governments to cooperate and on communication at the individual 
level, bilateral treaties, former business between the nations in question, diplomatic ties, etc.   
 
Consider, for instance, Article 9 of the OECD anti-bribery convention, which states: “Each Party 
[country] shall, to the fullest extent possible under its laws and relevant treaties and arrangements, 
provide prompt and effective legal assistance to another Party for the purpose of criminal 
investigations and proceedings brought by a Party concerning offences within the scope of this 
Convention and for non-criminal investigation within the scope of this Convention brought by a 
Party against a legal person”.  
 
Signatories to the OECD convention are thus expected to cooperate “to the fullest extent possible” 
to provide evidence and support the investigation of cases that have been initiated by other 
countries. “To the fullest extent possible” is not very specific, however, and requires no more than 
minimum collaboration. There are numerous opportunities for governments to find excuses, i.e. 
legal or diplomatic justifications, for why collaboration on a given case is not possible after all. 
Collaboration is very much up to individual countries and the degree to which they wish to assist 
other countries in their investigations. Bilateral dialogue and established contact prior to a request 
for collaboration can be decisive for a government’s willingness to collaborate and by extension for 
the prosecution of a given case. 40
Bilateral treaty 
Brazil and Norway have as yet no bilateral treaty on legal collaboration. While the issue is treated 
by the anti-corruption conventions, there are reasons for bolstering legal collaboration in other 
ways. The contents of international conventions are usually restricted to the largest common 
denominator between the signatories, and thus are generally formulated in vague terms. The 
outcome in respect of specific cases depends on how the contents of the conventions are interpreted. 
It is up to each single jurisdiction to decide how to implement the intentions of the conventions. 
 
For instance, in addition to signing the anti-corruption conventions and many other international 
treaties which include legal collaboration, the US government has also established a network of 
bilateral agreements in order to ensure sufficient collaboration when serious cases occur. Other 
countries followed rapidly, and international collaboration on anti-corruption investigations is 
                                                     
39 Harari and Berthod (2007) offer a broader discussion about international and bilateral collaboration on the contents of 
the OECD anti-bribery convention.  
40  Harari and Bethod (2007). 
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increasingly regulated by a combination of conventions and bilateral treaties. Regional conventions, 
such as the Inter-American Convention against Corruption and the EU Convention against 
Corruption, often complement the international conventions. When it comes to individual countries 
in different regions, with significant trade relation and perhaps also with different legal traditions 
(Civil Law versus Common Law), there might be a need to establish stronger legal collaboration. 
 
Regardless of how the content of conventions might be bolstered through formal or informal 
collaboration, there are other aspects that should be considered. These are related to informal 
collaboration, diplomatic sensitivity, and the increasing prevalence of letting companies involved in 
corruption collaborate on investigation.  
Informal collaboration  
Cooperation on investigations often occur through informal police-to-police channels, on public 
record information, locating persons, serving documents, executing requests for investigations, or 
conducting joint investigations.41 Provided that no coercive measures are envisaged, there will not 
always have to be a formal request at the government level. The willingness to follow up on 
informal requests to support an investigation conducted by another jurisdiction will probably be 
greater in cases where communication and good diplomatic relations between the two parties 
already exist, as is the case between Norway and Brazil.42
 
A good relationship between the countries is also important when a formal request is needed, for 
instance on extradition or actions to secure evidence. Asking for cooperation can be a sensitive 
issue diplomatically, since it indicates that corruption has occurred in the country from which the 
evidence must be secured.  In the investigatory stage, there might be uncertainty about how high in 
the bureaucratic system the crime has occurred. In some cases there might be a political 
unwillingness to pursue the case. Bilateral dialogue on anti-corruption and collaboration will ease 
these circumstances because it fosters confidence that investigations will not put a good diplomatic 
relationship at risk.  
Academic collaboration  
Another field where bilateral collaboration is important for developing better understandings of 
business climate challenges is academic research.  There is already some collaboration between 
research institutions in Brazil and Norway, and the Norwegian government has decided to 
strengthen general competence on Latin American issues. However, as far as we are aware, there is 
no specific collaboration between academic institutions on anti-corruption issues. The basis for 
collaboration exists, however, since both countries have several strong academic environments with 
research programmes on trade and anti-corruption issues.43 Joint programmes involving Norwegian 
and Brazilian academic institutions could profitably exploit the academic strengths of both countries 
to enhance knowledge about public sector-related phenomena, including corruption. 
 
                                                     
41 Abbell (2004). 
42 There is an increasing tendency now to let the firm undertake parts of the investigation in which the firm itself is 
involved. The suspected firm will hire “an independent team” of investigators and collaborate with this team, providing 
evidence of their own crime. These arrangements might speed up investigations, contribute to sort out the actual 
circumstances in a given case, and reduce expenses for the public. The responsibility for investigation and prosecution still 
rests with public institutions, and it is very important that the work of these independent institutions is not decelerated by 
this trend.  
43 Including IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica e Aplicada) in Brazil and CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute) in Norway. 
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